While we are dealing with two separate actions, at the outset of the
Trial I ordered that both actions were to be tried together.
Accordingly, I am giving one set of reasons for judgement. However,
I will refer to the two separate actions when the need arises.
Because of the circumstances which gave rise to both actions, many
of the facts and much of the law in each action are identical.
At the outset of the Trial, I permitted amendments to the
Plaintiffs' claims in both actions as follows:
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a) |
Paragraph 7a of each claim is added such that the Plaintiffs
in both actions plead and rely upon the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
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b) |
Paragraph 7b of each claim is added such that the Plaintiffs
in both actions plead and rely upon the doctrine of
bailment.
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I further permitted the
Defendant to amend his defence in both actions. The
amendments are as follows:
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|
a) |
The Defendant pleads and relies upon the Accidental Fires
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 4;
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b) |
The Defendant disputes the quantum of damages. |
FACTS:
Exhibit 1 is a Document Brief which the Plaintiffs filed as part of
the Plaintiffs' case. The Plaintiffs themselves did not testify.
However, the Plaintiffs, Robert and Mary Steffen, did file an
affidavit found at Exhibit 1, Tab 5. In addition, two witnesses gave
evidence on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
Two witnesses testified on behalf of the Defendant in each action,
the first witness being the Defendant himself and the second witness
being his wife.
The following facts are not in dispute:
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1. |
The Plaintiffs George and Patricia Gibson, herein referred
to as "Gibson", were the owners of a 1976 Austin Mini 1000;
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2. |
The Plaintiffs Robert and Mary Steffen, herein referred to
as "Steffen", were the owners of a 1967 Volkswagen Beetle;
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3. |
The Defendant resides in the village of St. Helen's where he
carried on business in his shop of restoring furniture and
restoring and repairing vehicles;
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4. |
On
January 5, 1996, there was an explosion and fire in the
Defendant's workshop;
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5. |
As
a result of the explosion and fire, the destruction of the
building and its contents was virtually complete. |
William Dankwardt, the Defendant,
testified. On January 4, 1996, being the day before the fire, Mr.
Dankwardt was working on a friend's truck. The truck was being
repaired because there was dampness when the fuel tank was full. At
approximately 11:30 pm, he stopped working on the truck for the
night, leaving the truck in the workshop overnight. Mr. Dankwardt
then shut the thermostat back and left the building. He does not
recall anything unusual in the workshop that night.
At approximately 5:30 am on January 5, 1996, Mr. Dankwardt went into
his shop. He did not touch the thermostat. He lay down on the dolly
and slid under the truck to assess what he had to do to finish the
repair job. He did not smell anything or notice anything unusual in
the building. As he rolled out from under the truck, Mr. Dankwardt
heard a click that he believes was caused by the arcing of the
ignition to fire up the oil furnace. A wall of flames immediately
followed. Eventually Mr. Dankwardt was taken to the hospital,
suffering from second and third degree burns.
Mr. Dankwardt's uncontradicted evidence was that:
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a) |
Mr. Gibson brought his car to the Defendant to be completely
restored.
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b) |
Mr. Gibson kept fire and theft insurance coverage on the car
because it was left at the Defendant's workshop at the risk
of the Plaintiff Gibson.
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c) |
Mr. Steffen dropped the parts off at the Defendant's
premises one day without the Defendant requesting them.
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d) |
Mr. Steffen told the Defendant that he (being Mr. Steffen)
did not have any place to keep the parts.
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e) |
The parts for the Steffen vehicle were on the Defendant's
premises at the sole risk of the Plaintiff Steffen. |
A copy of the Fire Investigation
Report prepared by J.C. Fox of the Office of the Ontario Fire
Marshal as a result of the fire on the Defendant's premises was
filed with the consent of all parties as part of Exhibit 1, being
Tab 10. Some of the details concerning the building are contained in
the Fire Investigation Report.
Mr. Dankwardt disagrees with some of the comments made by Mr. Fox in
his Report. While Mr. Fox stated in his Report that the furnace was
not sheltered or partitioned off from the remainder of the building
in any fashion whatsoever, Mr. Dankwardt testified that he had a
huge, heavy shield in front of the furnace. This shield was not
referred to by Mr. Fox at all. Freda Dankwardt, the wife of William
Dankwardt, testified that there was a shield around the furnace,
which shield was not visible after the fire.
Mr. Dankwardt testified that the lids were on the cans referred to
in paragraph 5 on page 3 of Exhibit 1, Tab 10 under
Description of Scene prior to the fire. In fact, Mr.
Dankwardt said that the flammable material still remained in the
building after the fire. After he was discharged from hospital, Mr.
Dankwardt attended at the scene and discovered that the storage
lockers which contained some of the material in his workshop were
totally destroyed by the explosion and fire. He testified that there
were no flammables or solvents left in the open area of the shop
outside the storage lockers at the time of the fire. Mr. Dankwardt
described the construction of the storage lockers. From the
evidence, it seems that they were secure and solid. Mrs. Dankwardt
testified that her husband was very careful with the storage of
lacquers, paint and other items in his workshop.
On page 4 of his Report, Mr. Fox stated that Mr. Dankwardt had
severe problems with his nasal area becoming plugged and that Mr.
Dankwardt was forced to frequently use "Otravin" in order to keep
his sense of smell functional. Both Mr. Dankwardt and his wife
testified that there was nothing wrong with Mr. Dankwardt's sense of
smell. In addition, the Defendant filed, as Exhibit 7, a Report
dated February 17, 1998 from Dr. Martin Bokhout, who has been Mr.
Dankwardt's doctor since 1990. This report says (in part): "To
the best of my knowledge, [William Dankwardt] has a normal sense of
smell".
While Mr. Dankwardt was both examined and cross-examined at length,
unfortunately Mr. Fox did not testify. Therefore, while we have his
Report, we do not have the benefit of his evidence on
cross-examination. Because of Mr. Dankwardt's hospitalization, Mr.
Fox never had the opportunity to speak to him and to obtain
information directly from him. I have had the benefit to observe the
manner in which both Mr. and Mrs. Dankwardt gave their evidence.
Where there are differences between the Fire Investigation Report
(Exhibit 1, Tab 10) and the evidence presented on behalf of the
Defendant, I prefer the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Dankwardt for the
reasons stated earlier in this paragraph.
Mr. Dankwardt testified that he did not have an explanation for the
cause of the explosion and resulting fire.
Mr. Leslie, on page 2 of his REPLY SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
PLAINTIFF, says that "Mr. Fox, in his report, points directly
to the "gasoline leak" as the most probable source [of
the vapours ], followed by the "mixed solvents and liquids" as
the next most likely [ source ]." (The emphasis is mine.)
With the greatest respect for Mr. Leslie, I do not read that
anywhere in the Report of Mr. Fox.
On page 1 of the Fire Investigation Report, Mr. Fox showed
the Fire Cause as "Accidental". At the conclusion of his
Report, Mr. Fox stated (in part):
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…this occurrence was accidental
in nature with the fire following a vapour explosion. The
ignition source would appear to be the furnace (thermostat
controlled) switching on… It is clear that the source of the
vapours involved in this occurrence could have come from a
gasoline leak on the Pickup truck, the stored (open)
containers of mixed solvents and liquids or from some
other undetermined source. |
(The emphasis is mine.)
DAMAGES:
The first witness to testify on the issue of damages was Ron Lipskie,
who was called by the Plaintiffs. Mr. Lipskie is an appraiser of
motor vehicles with over twenty years experience. In addition to his
oral evidence, Mr. Lipskie prepared reports which were filed as
Exhibits (Exhibit 1 - Tabs 6, 7, 8 and 9).
Mr. Lipskie testified that the Gibson vehicle was a total loss since
the damages to it were more than the value of the motor vehicle. He
stated that the Gibson vehicle was an unusual vehicle. Therefore, it
took more time than normal to conduct the appraisal of it. Initially
on January 30, 1996, Mr. Lipskie provided a report (which is found
at Tab 6) indicating a value in the amount of $ 2,800.00 - 3,000.00
plus the applicable taxes. As part of the report found at Tab 6, Mr.
Lipskie also provided a "TOTAL LOSS REPORT" (found at Tab 8) which
shows the detail of how he arrived at his figures. On February 26,
1996, Mr. Lipskie provided a further report (which is marked as
Exhibit 4). In Mr. Lipskie's evidence, and in the report marked
Exhibit 4, he testified that the value of the Gibson vehicle could
be as high as $ 4,000.00 plus applicable taxes. Under
cross-examination, Mr. Lipskie admitted that he had not appraised
very many Austin Mini automobiles. However, he looks at
approximately 1000 cars of all makes each year.
The claim being made by the Plaintiff Steffen involves a claim for
damage to auto parts for a 1967 Volkswagen Beetle. The vehicle
itself (which was parked outside the building that was destroyed by
the fire) was not damaged. However, auto parts that had been brought
by the Plaintiff Steffen to the Defendant's place of business were
heavily damaged in the fire since most of those parts were inside
the building.
Mr. Lipskie prepared a report outlining the cost to replace the
parts which were destroyed. That report is found at Tab 7 of Exhibit
1. Mr. Lipskie testified that one of the Plaintiffs, Mr. Steffen,
owned a parts supplies store and therefore could obtain the parts at
a lower price. Thus, in Mr. Lipskie's appraisal, he showed the parts
at cost, without any allowance for a mark-up.
Mr. Lipskie calculated the loss of the Plaintiff Steffen in the
amount of $ 1,427.78 without any allowance for taxes. (The evidence
indicates that it is not necessary to factor in an amount for
provincial sales tax because of the manner in which Steffen is able
to purchase the parts.)
When conducting both appraisals, Mr. Lipskie found the Defendant to
be very helpful.
For the major items, Mr. Lipskie did not see any discrepancies
between the list that Mr. Steffen had given him for the parts that
he had purchased and what the Defendant pointed out to Mr. Lipskie.
All of the parts were new. All suffered heat damage.
I found Mr. Lipskie to be a very straightforward, honest witness. He
is experienced and I accept his evidence.
The next witness to testify on behalf of the Plaintiffs was Kay
Lavery. Ms. Lavery is a claims representative with the Zurich
Insurance Company, the insurer for all Plaintiffs. She was able to
confirm ownership of the vehicle and parts by the Plaintiffs
together with payments being made to the Plaintiffs for the damages
sustained. (What we have in both cases is a subrogated claim being
made through each Plaintiff - as the insured - by Zurich Insurance
Company.) She further testified that there was no salvage money
received on either claim.
Nothing that was said or produced on behalf of the Defendant changed
the evidence led by the Plaintiffs in each action which would effect
the evidence I heard concerning the quantum of damages.
I, therefore, find that the amounts of damages suffered by the
Plaintiffs are as follows:
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1. |
The Plaintiffs Gibson have suffered damages in the amount of $
3,500.00 together with provincial sales tax of 8%, making a total of
$ 3,780.00.
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2. |
The Plaintiffs Steffen have suffered damages in the amount of $
1,427.78. |
LIABILITY:
Now I come to the issue of whether the Defendant is required in law
to pay any or all of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs.
Bailment
Does the doctrine of bailment apply in these cases ? If it does, was
the Defendant a bailee for reward or a gratuitous bailee ? What is
the standard of care for a bailee and does it differ between a
bailee for reward and a gratuitous bailee ? Who assumed the risk for
the Gibson vehicle ? Who assumed the risk for the Steffen auto parts
? These are the first issues that I must address when considering
the question of liability.
As stated by Mr. Justice Cory (as he then was) of the Ontario Court
of Appeal in Punch v. Savoy's Jewellers Ltd. et al (1986), 54
O.R. (2nd) 383 at page 388:
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Bailment has been defined as the
delivery of personal chattels on trust…that the trust shall
be executed and the chattels be delivered in either their
original or an altered form as soon as the time for which
they were bailed has elapsed….[The] legal relationship of
bailor and bailee…is created by the voluntary taking into
custody of goods which are the property of another….The
facts of this case demonstrate that Savoy was a bailee for
reward….
The bailee for reward must exercise due care for the safety
of the article entrusted to him by taking such care of the
goods as would a prudent man of his own possessions.
In Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons, Ltd., [1965] 2 All
E.R. 725, Lord Denning M.R. confirmed that when goods are
damaged or lost while in the possession of a bailee, the
bailee must prove either that he took appropriate care of
them or that his failure to do so did not contribute to the
loss. If the goods are lost or damaged while they are in
possession of the bailee, the burden is on the bailee to
show that the damage occurred without any neglect, default
or misconduct on the part of himself…. To escape liability,
he must demonstrate that the loss was without any fault on
his part…. |
The courts throughout Canada have
made it clear that the standard of care and diligence imposed on a
gratuitous bailee is lower than that required of a bailee for
reward. (Price v. Leblanc, [1957] 7 D.L.R. (2nd) 716 (New
Brunswick C. A.); MacDonald v. Pro-Line Trailers Ltd., [1996]
M.J. No. 318 (Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench); Davis v. Henry
Birks and Sons Ltd., [1981] 5 W.W.R. 559 (British Columbia
S.C.).)
In fact, various Canadian courts have held that a gratuitous bailee
is liable only if gross negligence is proven. (Melburn Truck Line
Inc. v. Plastmo Ltd., [1992] O.J. No. 209 (Ont. Court of Justice
- Gen. Div.); Ginsberg v. Vanstone Motors Ltd., [1949] O.W.N.
345 (Ont. H.C.J.); Carlisle v. G.T.R. (1912), 25 O.L.R. 372;
Degrace v. Central Garage Sales & Service Ltd. (1979), 24
N.B.R. (2nd) 557 (New Brunswick C.A.); Piper v. Geldart,
[1954] 2 D.L.R. (2nd) 97 (New Brunswick C.A.); Arrow
Transportation Systems Inc. v. Quadra Cartage Ltd., [1997] B.C.J.
No. 3036 (British Columbia Prov. Court); Polish Fraternal Aid
Society v. Kapusta, [1938] 3 W.W.R. 433 (Manitoba C.A.);
Martin v. Town N'Country Delicatessen Ltd. (1963), 45 W.W.R. 413
(Manitoba C.A.); Munroe v. Belinsky, [1995] M.J. No. 168
(Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench); Queen's Sales and service Ltd.
v. Smith, [1963] C.C.S. 317 (Nova Scotia S.C.); Rondeau v.
Chief, [1992] Y.J. No. 107 (Yukon Territorial Court);
Guenther v. Melfort Housing Authority, [1993] S.J. No. 95 (Sask.
Prov. Court)
Based on the evidence, I find that the Defendant was in possession
of the Gibson motor vehicle as a gratuitous bailee.
Before I decide whether the Defendant was negligent (either grossly
or ordinarily), I am aware that the uncontradicted evidence of the
Defendant was that the vehicle was left on the Defendant's premises
at the sole risk of the Plaintiff Gibson. Therefore, the Defendant
is not liable for any damage that the Gibson motor vehicle sustained
in the fire and explosion.
I further find, also based on the evidence, that the Defendant was
not in possession of the parts for the Steffen motor vehicle as a
bailee of any kind. Instead, the Defendant had only granted a
licence to the Plaintiff Steffen to leave the auto parts on the
Defendant's property for the assistance and convenience of the
Plaintiff Steffen. In any event, the uncontradicted evidence of the
Defendant was that the auto parts were left on the Defendant's
premises at the sole risk of the Plaintiff Steffen. Therefore, the
Defendant is not liable for any damage that the Steffen auto parts
sustained in the fire and explosion.
The Accidental Fires Act
In the event that I have misapplied the law which I have expressed
above on the issue of bailment and duty of care, I want to comment
on the Accidental Fires Act and the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur as they apply to this case.
The Accidental Fires Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A. 4, has only one
section. Section 1 provides (in part) as follows:
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No action shall be brought against any person in
whose…building or on whose land any fire accidentally
begins, nor shall any recompense be made by that person for
any damage suffered thereby; |
(The emphasis is mine.)
The most recent interpretation of the Accidental Fires Act by
our Ontario Court of Appeal is found in Neff v. St. Catharines
Marina Ltd. (1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 481. Mr. Justice Carthy (at
page 483 of that decision) said that " an accidental fire is not
one that is proved to have been accidental, rather it is one that
cannot, on a balance of probabilities, be traced to a particular
cause."
The Ontario Court of Appeal also considered the Accidental Fires
Act in 1981 in the decision of Paquette v. Labelle, 33
O.R. (2nd) 425. In both the Neff and Paquette
decisions, the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was also considered.
Mr. Justice Carthy, in the Neff case, said at page 486:
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As I read Paquette the court is
saying that the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur cannot arise from proof of the mere occurrence
of the fire. There must be evidence of the circumstances
under which the fire originated - a cause of the fire
against which to test the conduct of the defendant to assess
the existence of negligence…. |
In Neff, the Ontario Court of
Appeal goes on to reconcile the broad liability of a bailee against
the language of the Accidental Fires Act. Mr. Justice Carthy
says on page 487 that:
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…the key to reconciliation between the law of bailment
and the Accidental Fires Act is to isolate from the
statement of the bailee's duty, enunciated by Cory J.A.
above, [in Punch v. Savoy's Jewellers Ltd.] the reference:
"the bailee must prove either that he took appropriate care
of them or that his failure to do so did not contribute to
the loss" and in particular, the question of contribution to
the loss.
In most cases of bailment there will be an attributed cause
of the loss…. In those cases, it cannot be said to be an
accident in the sense of being incapable of being traced to
any cause; the evidence, wherever the burden falls, can test
whether the bailee's conduct contributed to that loss. If
the cause is unknown then the conduct of the bailee is being
examined without a reference point….
…Here the cause of the fire was unknown and, once that is
established in evidence, it is my view that the bailee has
by that very fact established that any failure on his part
to care for the goods did not contribute to the loss.
Conduct which contributes to the loss must relate to the
loss. |
Mr. Justice Carthy continues on page
488 of the Neff case by saying:
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…Here, the evidence of the boats
were there to be examined and positive evidence was
introduced that the cause of the fire could not be
identified. |
How does what Mr. Justice Carthy said
differ from the facts of this case ? As I stated earlier, Mr. Fox
from the Office of the Fire Marshal stated in his Fire
Investigation Report (Exhibit 1, Tab 10) that the cause of the
fire was "Accidental" with the source of the vapours coming
from various possible places, including "…some other undetermined
source." That statement is uncontradicted. Therefore, it would
seem to me that the Defendant (if he was a bailee) has established
that any failure on his part to care for the goods did not
contribute to the loss that was suffered by either the Plaintiff
Gibson or the Plaintiff Steffen.
Thus, the Accidental Fires Act provides a complete defence to
the Defendant in the circumstances of this case.
I would further add in any event that, based on the evidence in this
case, I would not attribute any gross negligence to the Defendant.
Thus, because I have already found, based on the evidence, that the
Defendant was a gratuitous bailee at best (as I earlier stated), the
Defendant would not be liable to either of the Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION:
Therefore, while I find that the Plaintiffs suffered damages in the
amounts that I earlier indicated, being $ 3,780.00 in the case of
Mr. and Mrs. Gibson and $ 1,427.78 in the case of Mr. and Mrs.
Steffen, I find that the Defendant is not liable to either
Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Defendant does not have to pay any money
to either Plaintiff for damages.
COSTS:
At the conclusion of the evidence, when it became evident that
written argument was being requested, both sides requested an
opportunity to deal with the issue of costs by way of a conference
telephone call after this decision has been released to all parties.
Accordingly, if the parties are unable to agree on the costs, they
may make arrangements with the Court Clerk for a telephone
conference call, during which I will entertain submissions on the
issue of costs (including the quantum if the costs are found to be
payable by anyone).
Dated at Goderich, Ontario this 13th day of July, 1998
______________________________________
Norman B. Pickell, Deputy Judge
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